Wide range, high precision and simplicity of the fundamental laws of nature rule out the possibility for them to be randomly generated or selected. Therefore purpose is present in their selec:on.
The laws of nature are discovered as composite and specific mathema:cal structures. As these structures are revealed, we unavoidably come to a certain ques:on regarding the structures themselves. First of all, why does any law expressed by one or another mathema:cal formula structure our world at all? While it is thinkable for a universe to be structured by any logically consistent system, out of this infinite set of structures only one determines our universe. Why this structure and not another? Why are the laws simple enough to be discovered? Why are they mathema:cally beau:ful? Who or what singled it out and on what ground?
In this way the laws of nature become a problem, though not in the usual scien:fic context of searching them out, but as something that requires its own explana:on. The illusory nature of an explana:on that does not go beyond natural laws was pointed out by Ludwig WiNgenstein[1]:
The whole modern concep:on of the world is founded on the illusion that the so--called laws of nature are the explana:ons of natural phenomena. Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, trea:ng them as something inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past ages. And in fact both are right and both wrong: though the view of the ancients is clearer in so far as they have a clear and acknowledged terminus, while the modern system tries to make it look as if everything were explained.
Here WiNgenstein cri:cizes a silent acceptance of a composite and special mathema:cal structure as the ul:mate explana:on of the world. Such explana:on barred from further ques:oning and not subject to reasonable ground of its own existence is an affirma:on of unreasonableness of this ground. In other words, it is an acceptance of absurdity as the ul:mate founda:on of existence. Such supers::on destroys the meaning of fundamental science by undermining the importance of reason, subjected by this supers::on to the absurd.
What can be the answers concerning the source of the laws of nature? Is there any way of choosing or rejec:ng one or another? That is the topic of discussion in the present ar:cle.
The Fine Tuning Ques)on
"There is now broad agreement among physicists and cosmologists", writes Paul Davis [2] , "that the universe is in several respects 'fine--tuned' for life". Similarly, Stephen Hawking has noted:
The laws of science, as we know them at present, contain many fundamental numbers, like the size of the electric charge of the electron [fine structure constant] and the ra:o of the masses of the proton and the electron. ... The remarkable fact is that the values of these numbers seem to have been very finely adjusted to make possible the development of life. [3] .
Another crucial point is ar:culated by Alexei Tsvelik [4] :
[since] the number of exis:ng life--imposing condi:ons by far exceeds the number of constants, their fulfillment could not be achieved by fine tuning of these constants and required also the right choice of the fundamental principles of physical laws.
The premise of the fine--tuned universe revived the old metaphysical problem of the source of order in the world as the problem of fine--tuning: who or what tuned the universe so fine? A pure scien:fic approach required finding an objec:ve answer: not "somebody" but "something" as the cause of tuning.
Order From Chaos
It is thought that this "something" could be any combina:on of laws of nature provided by one or another general theory and chao:c factors; or, using the terms of Platonic philosophy, any combina:on of forms and chaos. However, as it was noted by WiNgenstein, any theory used in that respect itself requires to be explained. John А. Wheeler expressed the same as a ques:on: why is this very theory structuring everything existent? Why doesn't some other theory instead? In other words, the use of any theory for this does not solve the problem of fine--tuning, but moves it to a higher level. The only way to solve this problem totally in the framework of science is to show a possibility of appearance of being from nothing, or chaosogenesis, the appearance of order from chaos. Indeed, theories, being specific formal structures, are limited and composite en::es, and thus lead to the ques:on "why this theory and not other?". Chaos per se is limitless and structureless, a totality intrinsically undivided into "this" and "that", whose various manifesta:ons differ from each other due only to the variety of doors that one or another theory opens for chaos to enter. Historically, the idea of chaosogenesis is very old, having been traced down to Hesiod and pre--Socra:cs, and it had been opposed by the Pythagoreans and Platonics. For instance, Plo:nus wrote: "Any aNempt to derive order, reason, or the direc:ng soul from the unordered mo:on of atoms or elements is absurd and impossible." [5] Not all contemporary cosmologists share Plo:nus' views on the chaosogenesis, so the idea is frequently pronounced.
Max Tegmark has formulated the "Ul:mate ensemble theory of everything", whose main mo:va:on is clearly expressed [6] :
If the TOE [theory of everything] exists and is one day discovered, then an embarrassing ques:on remains, as emphasized by John Archibald Wheeler: Why these par:cular equa:ons, not others? Could there really be a fundamental, unexplained ontological asymmetry built into the very heart of reality, splirng mathema:cal structures into two classes, those with and without physical existence? Aser all, a mathema:cal structure i s n o t "c r e a t e d " a n d d o e s n ' t e x i s t "somewhere". It just exists. As a way out of this philosophical conundrum, I have suggested that complete mathema:cal democracy holds: that mathema:cal existence and physical existence are equivalent, so that all mathema:cal structures have the same ontological status.
Thus, for Tegmark the terminus ul:mately explaining everything exis:ng is the totality of all mathema:cal forms, the platonic world. To "just exist", the mathema:cal structure has to be self--consistent, logically acceptable. What he doesn't men:on is the unity of these forms. This unity must not only somehow bind every one of them together but it has to guarantee their self--consistency. The forms though are mental en::es. They are not thinkable without a mind which contains them as truly self-consistent. Thus, we have to conclude that this unity, the terminus of Tegmark's being, is an absolute mind, even if it is not men:oned at all. What makes this mind special and dis:nc:ve from its various platonic versions is its total indifference to the forms it contains. That is what Tegmark calls "the mathema:cal democracy".
It has to be stressed, that purely by itself, without any forms involved, chaos cannot produce anything, and Tegmark's model is not an excep:on from this rule: it assumes that all possible worlds are based on mathema:cal structures, such as groups, algebras, fields, sets of equa:ons, and other formal systems. It also assumes that there is a way for these structures to show themselves as phenomena, and to be observed both as mathema:cal and physical objects. Chaos comes in this picture as a randomness of a universe we happen to be born in, with the only limita:on that the laws of this universe are compa:ble with life and consciousness. What makes Tegmark's model very special is its minimal involvement of a priori concre:za:on or selec:on principles, which is why we are equa:ng this model of "mathema:cal democracy" with chaosogenesis.
A possibility for the structure of the fundamental laws of nature to be random to some unclear degree and beyond that to be non--randomly selected by some unpronounced en:ty was expressed by several leading scien:sts, e. g. by Andrei Linde (see a cita:on below) and Steven Weinberg [7] :
…we have to keep in mind the possibility that what we now call the laws of nature and the constants of nature are accidental features of the big bang in which we happen to find ourselves, though constrained (as is the distance of the Earth from the Sun) by the requirement that they have to be in a range that allows the appearance of beings that can ask why they are what they are.
The Darwinian theory of evolu:on is widely believed to explain the birth of order from chaos. To follow its line of thought, our universe is considered a member of a huge or infinite ensemble of universes, one generated by the other, with daughter universes mostly inheri:ng the logical structure of the mother ones, adding some muta:ons on top [8, 9] . Aser the heredity and varia:on of the mul:plying logical structures are seNled, the third Darwinian principle, selec:on, can be introduced as well. This role is played by the so called weak anthropic principle, or WAP [10] , poin:ng out that only those universes can be observed where observers can appear, which selects a narrow class of fine--tuned universes as it is noted in Weinberg's quota:on above. Thus, though our universe is thought of in this Darwinian approach as ul:mately generated by chaos, its fine tuning apparently receives a scien:fic explana:on as a result of a Darwinian chaosogenesis. Although in the infinite megaverse only a :ny por:on of universes is fine--tuned for life and consciousness, the probability for any observer to see the universe as fine--tuned is one hundred percent. Nothing seemingly contradicts the assump:on that our universe is a random representa:ve of WAP--selected subset of Tegmark's mul:verse, but is that really so? Does the universe indeed have no clear signature excluding any possibility of it having been randomly selected from this totality of all possible mathema:cal structures? Is the concept of chaosogenesis irrefutable by any thinkable observa:on, i. e. is it not a scien:fic hypothesis? Apparently, it is considered as irrefutable by some leading experts. For instance, Brian Greenе clearly says that [11] 
A Cosmic Observer
"Observers" in WAP are not normally specified; it is not taken into account what it is namely they do observe. We suppose that to be qualified as "observers" they at least have to be conscious, as it is also reasonable to assume that conscious creatures observe their immediate space of life support and have access to at least empirical knowledge about it. However, this sort of knowledge has nothing to do with theore:cal knowledge of the big cosmos; the first by no means entails the second. Let us fix this point of an important dis:nc:on, a dis:nc:on between those simple, minimal, empirical observers and cosmic observers, who are discovering theories of big cosmos, seeing their universe both at extremely large and extremely small scales, far exceeding the scale of immediate life support. To become cosmic observers, minimal ones must live in a very specific world among the populated worlds. Specifically, their universe has to be theore:cally comprehensible on a big cosmic scale; their world has to be theore<zable, so to say. In other words, the possibility for observers to be not just simple but cosmic requires their universe to have a very special logical structure: it has to be described by elegant laws, covering many orders of magnitude of their parameters. Contemporary humanity is indeed a cosmic observer. For today, our scale of scien:fic cogni:on is described by an enormous dimensionless parameter ~10 45 ; that big is the ra:o of the sizes of largest object of physics, the universe, ~10 26 m, to the smallest ones, the top quark and the Higgs boson, corresponding to ~10 --19 m.
The Condi)on of Elegance
This condi:on of theore<zability apparently is extraneous to the selec:ve anthropic principle, that is, theore:zability seems unnecessary for the universes to be populated by conscious creatures or to be observed. In fact, the laNer condi:on is essen:ally local; it requires something like a life--friendly planet inside any universe. The former condi:on, though, is global; it requires the laws of nature to be elegant on a big cosmic scale, a scale by far exceeding that of the life on the planet. Generally, local condi:ons do not entail global consequences, and since theore:zability is a specific func:onal requirement detached from WAP selec:on, we have to conclude that it is highly unlikely for an observed universe to be theore:zable. Since we know, aser Isaac Newton, that our universe is theore:zable, chaosogenesis theory is apparently refuted. However, this refuta:on, being qualita:ve only, leaves a possibility to object. Its core statement, that theore:zability is a specific requirement detached from the anthropic condi:on for universes "to be observed" can be ques:oned. How can we be sure that theore:zability is logically independent from WAP? It would not be independent, if WAP did not allow for our theore:zable laws of nature any visible modifica:ons even at extremes of very large and very small scales, modifica:ons that might exclude the appearance of conscious beings for one or another reason. The very concept of a fine--tuned universe is sugges:ng to us that sort of an idea concerning the fundamental constants, and so, we may ask: what if the same is true concerning the very structure of the laws of nature? Although it is hard to believe that moderate modifica:on of, say, General Rela:vity at the distances exceeding the solar system, can drama:cally reduce the possibility of consciousness on our planet, we should consider a chance that it cannot be excluded. This very argument for the strong rela:on between the weak anthropic principle and theore:zability was recently suggested by A. Linde [12] :
... the infla:onary mul:verse consists of myriads of 'universes' with all possible laws of physics and mathema:cs opera:ng in each of them. We can only live in those universes where the laws of physics allow our existence, which requires making reliable predic:ons.
Let's accept this arguable hypothesis, and suppose that somehow WAP does not allow significant devia:ons of the laws of nature locally compa:ble with conscious beings from the globally theore:zable form. Then, the ques:on is: which devia:ons from the exis:ng laws are allowed by the anthropic principle? If the world is generated by chaos, all imaginable addi:onal terms to the life--selected ones are coming into play; the amplitude or width of the resulted devia:on is limited by the anthropic principle, but func:onal behavior of the devia:on is arbitrary. We have some es:ma:ons about the allowed devia:on in the context of fine--tuning as rela:ve varia:ons of the fundamental constants compa:ble with WAP, and the most stringent of them are at the order of 10 --3 , i.e. 0.1% [10] . Since we are considering here the problem of func:onal accuracy, the enormously stringent requirements on some constants, like the ini:al condi:ons at the big bang [13] , do not reduce the amplitude of these func:onal varia:ons. Thus, working on the Linde argument, we may roughly es:mate the sensi:vity of the anthropic selec:on to the rela:ve func:onal varia:ons of the fundamental laws to not be finer than 0.1% or so. If the laws of nature were generated by a random choice from Tegmark's mul:verse, they would be expressed by irregular func:ons possibly following elegant ones within a rela:ve width of ~0.1% or more. In this respect, it does not maNer whether chaos reveals itself through arbitrary func:ons or arbitrary mathema:cal structures; with Tegmark's "mathema:cal democracy" func:onal representa:ves of the two families are indis:nguishable and are dominated by extremely complicated, prac:cally irregular func:ons. The elegant formulas might be approxima:ons to the real irregular fundamental laws with that WAP--determined accuracy, but not beNer.
Moreover, measurements of the fundamental constants in this world would be reproducible only at the anthropic level, not beNer. If physicists of that hypothe:cal world tried making measurements of their fundamental constants at the beNer accuracy, they would realize that none of the measurements are reproducible at that level; they would all contain space--:me noise with a rela:ve amplitude of 0.001, driven by infinitely complicated terms of the true laws of nature. So, physics in that Tegmarkian universe would be stopped at the anthropic accuracy level simply because, with the probability of 100%, no reproducible measurement would be possible there with accuracy beNer than that.
We know though, that the real accuracy of our fundamental theories is not only beNer than anthropic, but many orders of magnitude beNer; they are absolutely precise on that scale. Indeed, the General Rela:vity test with a double neutron star PSR 1913+16 showed an unprecedented agreement between theory and observa:on at the level of 10 --14 . Another impressive demonstra:on of that extremely h i g h p r e c i s i o n r e l a t e s t o t h e Q u a n t u m Electrodynamics: the theore:cally predicted value of an electron's magne:c moment is confirmed by measurements with the accuracy ~10 --11 ; see e. g. Ref. [13] . Thus, many experiments which proved high precision of our elegant laws of nature, orders of magnitude beNer than the anthropic width, refute Tegmark's hypothesis.
